Naturalized metaphysicians defend the thesis that science licenses metaphysics, such that only metaphysical results that are based on the best science are to be considered legitimate. This view is problematic, due to the fact that the reasons they identify for such license are apparently self-defeating. 
Introduction just one of the authors mentioned above as encapsulating the views of 'Naturalized Metaphysics' generally. There is, however, a dialectic that each author must engage with and Chakravartty (2013) provides a paradigm example of the naturalist doing so. For the purposes of this paper, I will presume that Chakravartty gets the outlines of a naturalized metaphysics correct in its broad details. If we accept this presumption, we then face a further question about the success of Chakravartty's account of justifying naturalized metaphysics.
Chakravartty identifies a fundamental di culty in providing such a justification while adhering to naturalistic scruples, and he outlines a path to steer clear of this di culty while preserving the naturalist spirit. While there is much to learn from Chakravartty's response, I argue that it ultimately fails to take seriously the problems facing any attempt to locate the source of metaphysical authority in the empirical or a posteriori content of science.
After reviewing the general contours of the debate in the first section, in Section 2 I explore Chakravartty's proposed response to the argument that metaphysics cannot be naturalized. In Section 3 I argue that while the proposed response is a step forward on behalf of naturalizing metaphysics, it still does not take seriously the contention that science involves, inextricably, a contribution from the a priori. I conclude by considering what options remain for the naturalized metaphysician.
Science and Metaphysics
The motivation for a naturalized metaphysics has its source in the sorts of projects mentioned at the beginning of this paper. For example, Putnam (1967) argues that special relativity has important implications regarding the reality of temporally distant objects, and thus has important implications for our metaphysical theories about the nature of time. There is, the naturalized metaphysician insists, a very plain sense in which scientific discoveries influence what sort of metaphysical theories we take seriously-perhaps even claiming that such theories (such as Putnam's case with SR) can play the role of deciding which metaphysical theory should be accepted, or at least which we can reject.
This sort of presumption is widespread-consider for example the prevalence of Eddington's (1955) 'second table' in our everyday explanations about what commonsense objects are really like.
Granting this prima facie connection between the deliverances of science and metaphysical speculation, how are we to distinguish the naturalized metaphysician from the analytic (non-naturalized) metaphysician? In answering this question the naturalized metaphysician wishes to achieve two desiderata. First, they need to indicate what distinguishes their preferred approach from analytic metaphysics. Second, whatever this di↵erence is, it must constitute the reason that naturalized metaphysics is a better guide than analytic metaphysics to metaphysical truth. Chakravartty identifies the di↵erence as one of methodology:
The distinction between putatively acceptable naturalistic metaphysics and putatively excessive metaphysical inquiry does not concern what these forms of inquiry aim to do. . . [r] ather it concerns how these forms of philosophical inquiry go about achieving these aims. It is not in terms of general goals but rather in terms of precise methods that the distinction between naturalized metaphysics and some other brands of ostensibly worrying analytic metaphysics must be drawn. (Chakravartty 2013, 32) Since their ultimate aim is shared in common, the disagreement must be one about the means to achieve it. The suggestion of the naturalized metaphysician is that, since science is our best model of inquiry, we should look to science alone as a guide for achieving our aim. The di↵erence between this view and the analytic metaphysician's is then a disagreement about which model of inquiry carries with it the authority to license metaphysical inferences.
What about the preference for a scientific model of inquiry supplies the reason for naturalized metaphysics' superiority in the eyes of the naturalist?
Chakravartty puts it as follows:
[Analytic metaphysics] proceeds by way of a priori stipulation and theorizing, and produces claims that are empirically untestable. . . . Care is required in articulating the details of a naturalized metaphysics as just specified. Note that the naturalist claims that it is science to which the metaphysician must look and against which they must measure their theories. We should see immediately that the presence of a priori principles in science appears to undermine completely the naturalization of metaphysics as suggested above. For once a priori principles are present in science a problem arises-how are we supposed to adjudicate disagreements between scientists about which a priori principle is better justified, or how to interpret any given principle? Such disagreements are immune to resolution on purely empirical grounds, and instead must rely, (at least in part) upon conceptual analysis and the trading of a priori intuitions and reasons. And this activity is precisely the sort of thing the naturalist wishes to rule out by naturalizing metaphysics in the first place! It appears that naturalized metaphysics is faced with a charge of self-refutation-in eschewing a priori reasoning as a legitimate source of metaphysical theorizing, and by re-locating metaphysical legitimacy to the domain of science, the necessity of reasoning about a priori principles is reasserted.
The A Priori Contribution to Science
There are, however, several responses available to the aspiring naturalist faced with the purported incoherence of their project. One might simply retrench, denying that there are in fact any a priori principles operative within science, and reassert the picture of science in which observations are unproblematically free of theory, and completely determine whichever theory is to be derived from Chakravartty, instead, pursues a second response. Even if we admit that a priori principles are present in science, there is still a clear sense in which empirical considerations play a role in scientific experimentation and theorizing which they do not play in speculative metaphysical theorizing. Chakravartty proposes that we focus on this di↵erence:
Granting that scientific knowledge has a priori dimensions, it remains the case that the forms of inquiry we collect under the banner of the sciences are permeated with a posteriori content in virtue of the empirical concepts with which they are concerned. So why not take 'naturalized metaphysics' to label those metaphysical projects that are derived from, based on, inspired by, motivated by, constrained by, and grounded in this specifically empirical content, as opposed to scientific knowledge more generally? (Chakravartty
2013, 42 emphases added)
The strategy is to simply work our way through science piecemeal, examining it part by part, and partitioning out the specifically empirical content from those parts that are infected with a priori principles. It is this empirical content that will serve as the basis for naturalized metaphysical projects. 1 Even this response is not wholly satisfactory for Chakravartty however:
[T]he criterion of legitimacy suggested is far too easy to fulfil. Indeed, there is good reason to think that it is generally trivially satisfied, which would entail that every metaphysical project is an Ultimately, Chakravartty sees that the purely empirical content of science, as such, is too weak to constrain metaphysics in any meaningful way. This is just to say that even the most speculative metaphysical theories (such as Platonism) are empirically adequate! The sort of metaphysical theories that such a principle would bar are theories that no one could take seriously, since they would fail to recover the appearances they were initially mobilized to The task of a naturalized metaphysics, on this reformed view, is not to favor metaphysical hypotheses derivable from the empirical, since every metaphysical hypothesis can be so derived. Instead, its task is to articulate the particular kinds of relations in which hypotheses can stand to the empirical content of science and favor those which stand in acceptably 'close' relations to this empirical content.
Granting this revised picture of the task and subject matter of a naturalized metaphysics, there is an important corollary: The process of deciding the appropriate criteria by which to separate out legitimate metaphysics from its more speculative cousins-determining how experientially distant is too far, or how unrisky is too safe-will be open-textured and subject to considerable interpretation and argumentation. Note that nothing about the concept of experiential distance, even if it gave us a well-ordering of metaphysical theses arrayed from 'close' to 'distant', would conclusively tell us where to 'draw the line' between hypotheses su ciently close, and those too distant.
I agree with Chakravartty that it is important to recognize the implications of the radical underdetermination of the metaphysical by the empirical. Since even the most speculative metaphysics has as its explanandum phenomena arising from everyday experience, identifying naturalized metaphysics by the constraint that its speculation must merely agree with everyday experience is no real constraint at all. Additionally, he is right to give up the idea that there can be some objective demarcation criterion that rationally compels us to divide legitimate/naturalized metaphysics from illegitimate/non-naturalized metaphysics. How speculative one may permit their metaphysics to become is not purely a matter of logic and reflects other commitments as well. above), by suggesting that naturalized metaphysics can be cashed out in terms of measuring the relation of theoretical claims to the "specifically empirical content" of science, he tacitly endorses the second assumption. But, we should reject this second assumption for the same reasons that we rejected the first: the a priori principles present in science are not justified by experience, and instead are presupposed to give experience content in the first place.
In order to make explicit the role this latter assumption plays (and the problem it poses) for Chakravartty's proposed account of naturalized metaphysics, let us consider one of his favored parameters: experiential distance.
In general, entities 'closer' to experience are supposed to have a stronger claim to being legitimate objects of metaphysical inquiry than those more distant.
But how are we supposed to determine how close an entity is, or the relative ordering of various entities? Chakravartty's examples give us little by way of guidance in any but the easiest cases. The manner in which I detect a dog versus a protein are clearly di↵erent-dogs are macroscopic objects which can be observed by one or more of our sensory modalities; proteins are microscopic objects whose presence is only indicated through a chain of inferential steps.
But of course di↵erentiating between dogs and proteins is not of great interest to the naturalized metaphysician. How might we determine the relative proximity to the empirical of more di cult cases, like between (say) an electron and its electric charge? Perhaps this is an easy case-"clearly electrons are closer to experience, since they are objects, whereas electric charge is a property, and thus more abstract." But a similar case can be made for the converse, since properties are what are directly detected, not the object itself.
Adjudicating this disagreement cannot proceed solely by way of examining the experimental apparatus again, because this disagreement is one about the ontological status of objects versus properties, not about whether we see (for example) a trace in the cloud chamber. Only after settling the question of which is more directly detectable (substances or properties?) can we agree on the empirical content of our experience. In order to apply Chakravartty's parameter of experiential distance to theoretical entities, we require that there is some empirical content in our experience which is stable and against which we can do the measuring. However, the empirical content of experience is itself theory-laden. Two people with di↵erent theories will see di↵erent empirical content in the same data. We can generalize these points by drawing a distinction between the data of an experiment, and the empirical content of that same experiment. It is correct to insist that the data of an experiment are shared between all competent observers (under standard conditions, etc.). But to insist then that the data completely determine the empirical content of the experiment is to invite back in the idea that observations stand free from the theories they confirm. The data never speak clearly for themselves-we require a theoretical framework in order to determine the significance of the data. If we admit this much, then insofar as there are a priori principles at work in our theories (as Chakravartty grants, again see §1 above), the empirical content of science cannot serve as a theory-free background against which all metaphysical theories can be compared. Empirical content-the significance of the data-will be relative to metaphysical commitments already accepted.
The consequence of this point is that the charge of incoherence against the naturalized metaphysician remains. Recall above, naturalized metaphysics appeared incoherent since science did not rule out a priori principles and commitments but instead required them in the first place. Chakravartty suggested that the naturalized metaphysician escape this problem by judiciously avoiding those a priori principles wherever they appear in science, and picking out piecemeal the empirically significant parts of science, grounding our metaphysics on that. What I've argued for here is that a picture of science where such a piecemeal process is possible-where there is an unproblematic and objective partition in the parts of science which are infected with a priori commitments, and those which are not-is as much of a myth as the naïve picture of science Chakravartty saw fit to reject.
Prospects for a Naturalized Metaphysics
What responses remain open to the aspiring naturalized metaphysician? First, the naturalist could once again retrench, insisting that there is unambiguous empirical content, theory-neutral and given in experience. But as was remarked before, this position requires that one reject a significant portion of the widely accepted philosophy of science literature about theory-ladenness and underdetermination. Returning to this caricatured picture of science looks implausible as long as the naturalist insists that we should take science seri-ously.
The second option is to admit defeat, and accept a place for analytic metaphysics in a general model of inquiry. Tethering metaphysics to the whole of science wasn't su cient to escape the presence of a priori reasoning, and recourse to the 'empirical content' of science didn't escape the presence of antecedent metaphysical commitments. Perhaps the naturalist has no further responses, and must let a priori metaphysics in.
Chakravartty, and the aspiring naturalist appear to be caught in a dilemma.
On one hand, if one wishes to preserve a metaphysics grounded in the pure a posteriori-a metaphysics free of any a priori principles, and informed solely by what bare experience 'tells us'-then it appears as though we must commit ourselves to an implausible and unsophisticated caricature of science, one that does violence to more nuanced accounts of scientific practice. On the other hand, if we wish to develop a naturalized metaphysics that accounts for the actual practice of science, it looks like we're forced to admit that scientists themselves have as many a priori metaphysical assumptions as other folk, and metaphysical conclusions based o↵ such assumptions are just as subject to a priori critique as more speculative theories of analytic metaphysicians.
However there is, I think, a third option that allows us to escape the dilemma, albeit at a (modest) cost to the naturalist. My argument about the antecedent role of a priori principles in science shows only that what counts as the empirical content of an experiment will always be relativized to whatever theory is a priori accepted. The anxiety about a priori intuitions playing a role in determining these theories assumes that the task of metaphysics is to discover reasons and evidence for identifying one metaphysical theory as true, at the expense of its competitors. If this is the case-if any metaphysics worth doing is metaphysics that must eventually settle on a single correct theorythen perhaps the anxiety is justified. But I see no reason why the naturalized metaphysician must accept this assumption.
Instead, why not accept that the empirical content, and thus the content which can ground interesting metaphysical theorizing, will be relative to the theories already accepted, and leave it at that? For surely there are other ways of determining which theory we should both accept, besides a priori demonstrations that one is rationally unacceptable, and the other rationally compulsory.
Pragmatic reasons can be mobilized to convince those with di↵erent a priori principles of the attractiveness of one's own position. Recall Chang's (2008) principle of single value-we aren't compelled to infer from its utility for the scientist its status as a metaphysical truth. Rather we can frame its utility in hypothetical terms: If we want to measure temperature, then we must employ the principle. And in cases where such pragmatic reasons are unclear or uncompelling, there is no obvious reason why the naturalized metaphysician cannot accept a pluralism about the metaphysical theories which arise from the empirical content of di↵ering antecedent a priori principles.
